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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Azerbaijan’s mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem is the result of
both an internal war between Azerbaijan and Armenian separatists—which saw landmines laid
by both sides throughout the duration of the conflict between 1992 and 1994—and Russia’s
hasty and careless efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores, which left live rockets and shells
strewn over large areas of southern Azerbaijan.
To address its contamination problem, Azerbaijan created the Azerbaijan National Agency for
Mine Action (ANAMA) in 1998. The ANAMA was charged with coordinating activities in the
areas of demining, mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance. Having limited operational
capacity, ANAMA signed an agreement with UNDP, creating the Azerbaijan National Mine
Action Programme in 1999, which included a UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international
financial contributions and the provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. With an eye on
developing Azerbaijan’s national operational capacity, much of UNOPS’ contracting focused on
hiring organisations like the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) and other private groups to help train
national staff in demining and EOD, and UNICEF and the ICRC to integrate MRE into curricula of
schools in mine/ERW affected districts and to train teachers to carry out MRE.
Azerbaijan adopted its first national strategy in 2001, which mandated ANAMA to manage most
mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal outside technical
support. The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the departure of the last Chief
Technical Advisor, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor. In fact, since the
programme was nationally owned in the first place, there was never a question of whether the
programme would transition from the UN to national ownership. For this reason, the
programme had mainly focused on gaining knowledge in mine action—a new field in
Azerbaijan—and allocating resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended
UN presence within the national agency. ANAMA, therefore, sought to increase its national
capacity and management control, while also welcoming support, but not authority, by the UN
and other partners.
Through full nationalisation, ANAMA began to develop new methods and procedures that were
better adapted to the national situation. In addition, after nationalisation, a number of donors
and the national government began to entrust ANAMA with more resources. With greater
responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff paid more
attention to being efficient and effective, with a great measure of success.
Azerbaijan illustrates that transition often refers to shifting the balance between foreign and
national staff in decision-making at all levels, rather than fully shifting from a UN-led
programme to a nationally-owned one. The Azerbaijan case illustrates that the government
itself initiated and had ultimate authority and ownership of the mine action programme from
the beginning, even if external funding and operational support played a major role. ANAMA,
then, demonstrates that national mine action programmes should aim to be fully nationalised
while also benefiting from continuing partnership with the UN and others.

INTRODUCTION
Azerbaijan is located in the Caucasus region of southeast Europe, and shares borders
with Russia, Iran, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia (Map 1). The total population in 2011
was over nine million people. Slightly more than 50 per cent live in urban areas, half of
whom live in the capital city of Baku.
Azerbaijan is a middle income country with an average GDP of just over USD 10,000.
While agriculture remains an important source of employment, the single largest
contributor to national income is the petroleum sector. With the opening of the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan petroleum pipeline in 2005, the economy has been fuelled by
construction and other projects financed from petroleum proceeds. Nonetheless,
average salaries remain low by European standards, with low incomes particularly
common among internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the areas affected by
landmines and conflict.
The mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a direct result of
the break-up of the Soviet Union, which included Azerbaijan’s declaration of
independence in October 1991. Two main factors, explained below, are the cause of the
current problems.
In 1988, Armenian separatists in the Azerbaijan districts of Nagorno-Karabakh declared
their independence from Azerbaijan. Separatists and Armenian forces, with Russian
support, fought a war with Azerbaijan from 1992 until a ceasefire was signed in 1994.
However, the parties have not signed a peace agreement and violations of the ceasefire
at the line of control are frequent. The separatist forces occupied Nagorno-Karabakh
and seven surrounding districts, displacing an estimated 1.5 million people (nearly 20
per cent of the population) in the process. Some territory was recovered by Azerbaijan
in 1993-94.
The armies of both sides were trained by the Soviets as regards use of landmines, so
sometimes laid pattern minefields. However, many of the fighters were irregular forces
who followed more random approaches to landmine use. Most of the population
centres, water, power and road infrastructure, as well as some agricultural land in the
areas that exchanged hands were affected by mines and ERW.
Azerbaijan was an important element in the southern defence structure of the Soviet
Union, ready for possible NATO assaults from Turkey or through Iran. Many Soviet
Army bases and training ranges were located in Azerbaijan, together with one of the
Soviet Union’s largest arms stockpiles. When the Soviet Army withdrew from
Azerbaijan in 1991, efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores left live rockets and
shells strewn over large areas. Smaller quantities of munitions were buried near many
bases.
The first General Survey, conducted in 2001 in the 11 most affected districts, identified
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64 affected settlements and 60 square kilometres of contamination. The Landmine
Impact Survey (LIS) conducted in 2002-2003 identified 480 mine-affected communities
in 18 out of 68 districts nationwide, with a total of 970 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) affecting 514,000 people. Nearly two-thirds of the SHAs were affected by
unexploded ordnance (UXO) alone, with 163 SHAs over an area of 44 square kilometres
contaminated by the explosive dispersal of UXO from the Saloglu arms storage site. As
many as 210 low impact communities with 307 SHAs had only UXO hazards creating one
or zero blockages to livelihoods assets (eg crop land). More than half of mine-affected
communities are in Fizuli district, while more than half of the UXO-affected
communities are in Aghstafa district.
The landmine/ERW situation in the currently occupied territories is unknown, although
estimates suggest that it could be roughly comparable to the extent of problem in the
accessible areas. The extent of the use of mines around the current Azerbaijan National
Army bases (away from the frontline) and on the borders with Russia, Iran, Georgia and
Turkey is unknown, although some border minefields are reported to have been
removed by the military.
A total of 2,882 landmine victims are registered in the IMSMA database, as a result of all
data collected since the first International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) efforts in
1996. Of those, 2,372 are clearly identified by sex, date of birth, date of incident and
type of injury and the other 510 are classified as “other”. Nearly all are victims of mines
laid during the recent conflict. The LIS identified 51 victims during the two years prior to
the survey, of whom 98 per cent were men. The number of victims has fallen from
roughly five a month in 2005 to about one every two months in 2010 and 2011 (Table
1). The vast majority of victims are men between the ages of 18 and 40, often involved
in mine accidents while on military duty.
Demining (clearance and survey) has shown that, while landmines are widespread,
mined areas are not generally dense. Compared to other conflicts, anti-tank (AT) mines
are relatively more common than AP (anti-personnel) mines. The most widespread
hazard is UXO on the many battle areas and old ammunition stores.
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
Presidential Decree 854 of 18 July 1998 created the Azerbaijan National Agency for
Mine Action (ANAMA), which reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State
Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. The Government of Azerbaijan and
UNDP established the internationally supported national mine action programme on 2
April 1999.
ANAMA was created with the responsibility to coordinate action in areas of demining,
mine risk education, and victim assistance. The agreement included the creation of a
UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international and government financial
contributions and provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. As of 2011, the
Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme wascomprised of three main organisations
plus other actors and activities, as they have developed from the early years of the
national mine action programme (Chart 1):

Chart 1
Key Features of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme
Strategic purpose
Support recovery and rehabilitation of areas and
population affected by conflict with Armenia
NMAA/MAC
ANAMA
National demining operators ANAMA
Relief Azerbaijan (RA-Dayag)
International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)
International demining
None
operators
National MRE operators
ANAMA
RA-Dayag
IEFP
Ministry of Education
Community risk education committees
National MVA operators
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection
ANAMA (vocational training and micro credit)
Core funding channels
Government of Azerbaijan
UNDP Trust Fund
Bilateral donor cooperation
Largest funders
Government of Azerbaijan
(over USD 1 million
USA
cumulative)
European Commission
NATO
UNDP
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By the end of 2010, ANAMA had eliminated nearly 50 per cent of the 306 square kilometres of
SHAs identified during the 2006 review with local authorities, with 155 square kilometres

remaining. The national programme has been releasing land through clearance and
survey at an annual rate of about 30 square kilometres since 2008 (Table 2).
Prior to the establishment of ANAMA, the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) conducted
mine clearance in the former conflict areas under their control. This clearance
reportedly focused on defensive minefields surrounding their own bases as well as on
major roads and some other areas. While ANA provided no minefield maps to ANAMA,
it reportedly cleared over 19,000 AT and 22,000 AP mines from 15 minefields between
1994 and 1997. Establishment of ANAMA reflected the Government agreement with
the international community that humanitarian mine action should be managed by a
civilian agency.
STRATEGY

ANAMA’s core goal is to achieve an Azerbaijan where all people live free from the threat
of landmines and ERW. Its attention focuses on making it safe for IDP resettlement and
removing hazardous obstacles to development projects. It has a twofold strategy:
(a) to ensure safety and remove hazards from the currently accessible areas affected by
the conflict
(b) to expand, in order to identify and resolve the problem of landmines and ERW when
the currently occupied territories become accessible.
Broad priorities for ANAMA and the national programme were established from the
beginning as:
•
•
•
•

To clear areas of life-threatening dangers
To support the resettlement of IDPs through clearance of houses and
infrastructure required to support communities
To clear construction sites as requested by aid and development agencies
To support food security through clearance of agricultural and grazing land

Operational criteria for prioritisation/selection of tasks since 2001 include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The area must be secure and free of fighting
The task must conform to national priorities
Refugees or IDPs are returning into the area
Reconstruction tasks have to be planned, funded and ready to commence under
the national reconstruction programme
Local authorities and communities must have been consulted
The population must derive immediate humanitarian, economic or social
benefits after the operation
4

MINE RISK EDUCATION

The ICRC, through its work with Azerbaijani IDPs, which began in 1996, was actively
involved in mine risk education (MRE). It carried out the following:
•
•
•

developed a database of mine victims
carried out mine awareness sessions in IDP communities
trained health and education personnel working there

ANAMA, with the support of UNICEF, took over responsibility for MRE from ICRC at the
beginning of 2000. Key ICRC national staff were transferred to ANAMA, as was the
victim database. UNICEF worked with ANAMA from 2000-2004, with community
outreach MRE through volunteer teacher, health workers and others. Since 2004, as
the result of an agreement between ANAMA, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education,
MRE has been integrated in schools as a classroom subject in mine-affected areas.
ANAMA continues to successfully promote community MRE committees working with
local authorities to spread MRE materials and monitor local accidents.
MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Even though a Mine Victim Assistance Strategy was adopted in 2004, it is more accurate
to say that there is a range of mine victim assistance (MVA) efforts rather than a
coherent MVA programme. Azerbaijan has legislation that guarantees war victims and
persons with disabilities the right to:
•
•
•

medical treatment
other social support
pensions

These laws predate the mine action programme, and were reinforced by the 2009
ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its
Optional Protocol. The rights and protections under these laws extend to mine victims.
ANAMA established the Mine Victim Assistance Working Group in 2003 to bring
together local and international NGOs, government agencies and UN organisations
working on the issue. In 2004, ANAMA conducted a Mine Victim Assistance Needs
Assessment, the results of which continue to guide the work of all major MVA actors.
Most victims received emergency medical and prosthetics support. Many survey
respondents, however, identified the lack of support in the areas of social and economic
reintegration as a problem.
ANAMA’s role in mine victim assistance primarily is to ensure that:
(a) the appropriate range of support is provided to victims, leading to increased focus
on economic and occupation reintegration
5

(b) victims and their families are aware of their rights and of the assistance available
In addition, AMAMA supports pilot vocational training and micro-credit projects for
mine victims and their families.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Although Azerbaijan has not committed itself to the destruction of its own stockpiles of
primarily Soviet era mines, the issue of destruction of abandoned soviet munitions
stocks is a concern which ANAMA has successfully responded to with the support of
NATO/NAMSA. As a result of the success of the Saloglu project (see section 5 below),
the government has tasked ANAMA (rather than the Ministry of Defence) with a cleanup of the other ex-Soviet munitions storage areas.
OTTAWA CONVENTION ADVOCACY

Azerbaijan is not a signatory of the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention. It
has indicated that it will not be able to sign the Convention as long as the conflict with
Armenia continues, but that it does not foresee any obstacle to sign once that conflict
has been resolved. Therefore mine action is an internal safety and development issue
rather than a treaty obligation. ANAMA attends the regular working groups and annual
meetings of the Ottawa Convention as an observer. It has voted in favour of the annual
UN General Assembly Resolution against landmines since 2005 and has provided
voluntary Article 7 reports since 2008. These reports describe the known problem and
progress made, but they are incomplete as regards the existence of stockpiles and
mined areas under the control of the military.
While ANAMA does not have a role in advocacy of the Ottawa Convention, it has an
active public relations role to make known the dangers and damage caused by
landmines and ERW to the people and development of Azerbaijan. Since the geographic
extent of the problem is not nationwide, ANAMA has had to work proactively to ensure
that government officials and the public as a whole are aware that Azerbaijan has this
problem. It issues a monthly internet newsletter and press releases to maintain
awareness of the problem and the programme actions. It also issues specific press
releases whenever there is a mine accident or important mine action event. The news
items are usually picked up by the local media.
Finally, the “Mine Danger” textbook developed by ANAMA and approved by the
Ministry of Education in its regular curriculum contains a section on the APMBC and
notes that high-ranking government officials have repeatedly stated that “the Republic
of Azerbaijan will discuss the Treaty and adopt the decision to join it as soon as our
lands are liberated from occupation.”
RESOURCE MOBILISATION

ANAMA took the lead in resource mobilisation from UNDP in 2003. ANAMA found that
6

some donors (eg USA) preferred to contribute to it directly, and their contribution
increased significantly when ANAMA assumed responsibility. Other donors prefer to
contribute through UNDP, and ANAMA values the trust fund management role which
UNDP provides, which will become much more important at such time that ANAMA has
access to work in the currently occupied districts. Azerbaijan is now the largest single
contributor to the national mine action programme as well as to the UNDP Trust Fund in
support of the national programme.
The number of donors has grown from three donors at the beginning of the programme
to a cumulative total of 17 (Table 3). Principal partners each contributing more than
USD 1,000,000 are US Dept of State, European Commission, NATO/NAMSA and UNDP.
GENDER

The UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action were issued after the programme had been
nationalised. There are no women deminers. In 2000, MAG and ANAMA started to
develop a women’s demining section, and interviewed some candidates, but finally
decided not to proceed with it. Relief Azerbaijan employed some women as translators
during the period of training with MAG. The LIS survey teams were comprised of both
men and women, and the community interview process ensured that both men and
women were consulted. Some of the vocational training and micro-credit programmes
focus on women particularly as indirect victims. ANAMA headquarters staff is 30 per
cent women, including the heads of two departments. The majority of trained MRE
facilitators (teachers) are women. ANAMA maintains and reports mine victim data on a
sex and age disaggregated basis.

7

HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
In 1996, the Government, in coordination with the World Bank and UNDP, created the
Azerbaijan Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (ARRA) to oversee reconstruction
of the areas that had been occupied by the Armenian forces and then recovered by
Azerbaijan. During preparatory planning for rehabilitation and return of IDPs to the
war-affected areas, the Government recognised the need for a programme to remove
mines/ERW and that such efforts would need international support. As ARRA began its
work it encountered landmine obstacles to reconstruction and IDP return that
confirmed the need for a demining programme. This founding link of mine action to
reconstruction, IDP return and development has been maintained ever since.
After Presidential Decree 854 established the National Demining Agency (soon ANAMA),
Government and UNDP began the negotiation of project AZE/98/003/07 to establish a
joint “national mine action programme”, to provide technical assistance to the new
agency and to establish a trust fund to receive financial contributions to support the
national programme. The project document (prodoc) was signed on 2 April 1999. The
parties recognised the need for international training and material assistance to develop
the capacity to fulfil the role of ANAMA, with the prodoc stating that “Once fully trained
and equipped, ANAMA will assume the pivotal role in the field of all mine action
activities in Azerbaijan.”
ANAMA was to be a mine action coordination body, without its own operational
capacity. Clearance was to be conducted by national and international NGOs
established and accredited for this purpose. ANAMA was to report to the State
Commission on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of War-Affected Areas (SCRRA), and
the Director of ANAMA to be appointed by the Chairman of the SCRRA (Deputy Prime
Minister), with the agreement of the President and in consultation with UNDP.
From the beginning of the national mine action programme, UNDP was the principal UN
partner of the government. UNDP provided the framework for technical and financial
support following the establishment of the national mine action programme. UNDP
cooperation with ANAMA has continued without interruption, and is now under its
fourth prodoc.
Initial technical assistance to ANAMA was shaped by the period when it began. ANAMA
was developed during a period of great a debate in the international mine action
community concerning:
•
•
•
•

standards (IMAS)
database system (IMSMA)
structure of NMAA and MAC
survey (LIS)
8

•
•
•

MAC coordination model (not operations - contracting)
prioritisation (impact)
management development (senior and middle management training)

At the time ANAMA was established, nearly all MACs had been setup and managed by
the UN, typically as part of a peacekeeping mission, including those in Afghanistan,
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique. Even those
which had been handed over to the national government often still received multiple
international advisors who were directly involved in day-to-day management of the
programme. This meant that nearly all experienced potential international advisors
understood their role as that of managing the programme, with particular attention to
field operations.
A new consensus following the 1997 Department of Humanitarian Affairs study on the
“development of indigenous mine action capacities” highlighted the importance of an
organisational separation between the programme management capacities of the
national institution and the operational capacities of its field partners1. This was
reflected in the early decision to establish a national NGO to manage deminers rather
than have them directly recruited into a division of ANAMA.
While UNDP assistance did not begin with a fully detailed overall capacity development
strategy, there was a clear understanding in the mine action community as to what
capabilities a national authority and mine action centre should have. The UNDP prodoc
included the development of a mine action plan, comprising six components:
•

•
•
•
•
•

a national demining agency capable of planning, managing and coordinating
mine action, undertake resource mobilisation activities, and support in its
capacity development
mine surveys, marking, documentation and creation of a national mines
database
coordinated mine action planning, prioritisation and awareness programmes
training, quality management, mine/UXO clearance in support of reconstruction
programmes
victim support activities
public relations and advocacy for support of a ban on use of landmines

ANAMA’s original Strategic Plan, adopted in October 2001, focused on development of
an independent national capacity capable of working with minimal external technical
advisors by 2003. Its specific goals addressed the need for capacity in six core areas:

11

Eaton, et al
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

overall management
demining (clearance and survey)
MRE
information management
training and quality management
resource mobilisation

Quantitative aspects of the Strategic Plan were revised in November 2003 to consider
results of the LIS. Priorities included:
•
•
•

supporting mechanical demining
strengthening strategic planning, management, coordination and control of
operational activities
revising standard operating procedures in accordance with national experience
and standards

The 2002-2003 Work Plan further emphasised that “The nationalisation of the Program
will remain a main goal to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for outside
technical support.”
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The first ANAMA staff were recruited in May 1999 and the first international advisors
arrived in mid-summer. By March 2000, ANAMA had:
•
•
•
•
•

developed a national mine action plan
initiated a national mine database
constructed administrative buildings
selected training areas
begun to purchase equipment

The UNDP-Government project signed on 2 April 1999 named UNOPS as the
cooperating agency for the recruitment of international advisors and procurement of
demining services. Early efforts of the Chief Technical Advisor and the Regional Advisor
focused on
(a) setting up a regional base in Fizuli district, the highly impacted district where
operations were to begin
(b) procurement of equipment for the yet to be created operational demining
teams
(c) writing National Mine Action Standards derived from the International Mine
Action Standards and National SOPs derived from experience in other countries
10

(d) selecting a national NGO (Relief Azerbaijan) to manage the training of the
demining teams
Following the existing model, the technical advisors supplied by UNOPS were in
operations, information management, and programme management; ANAMA proved
strong in all these areas. UNOPS provided four full time advisors: Chief Technical
Advisor, Regional Operations Advisor, Quality Assurance (QA) Advisor and Information
Systems Advisor. The QA advisor was mobilied as a United Nations Volunteer (UNV)
and the information systems advisor was provided on an in-kind basis by the
Government of Switzerland, which had supported development of special information
management software for mine action.
ANAMA received 12 long term advisors through UNOPS over the following five years,
with an equal or greater number of other international advisors supplied by contractors
and other donors. UNICEF supported the development of MRE materials and outreach
training. Each advisory role was important in setting up ANAMA, and each was phased
out as it became less necessary. The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) position was
maintained longest and was finally phased out in 2004.
UNOPS contracted with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to train deminers, section leaders
and site supervisors and develop the capacity of the national NGO to manage the
demining teams. MAG began working on this in March 2000 and deployed the first four
sections (27 deminers in total) by June. By the beginning of 2001, MAG trained four
national section leaders from the deminers, but insisted that it needed to maintain
more experienced international staff as site supervisors. This was an issue of concern to
the new National Director when he arrived in April 2001, since it implied postponing
nationalisation of the programme. MAG concluded its UNOPS contract at the end of
2001 without having trained supervisors.
UNOPS contracted Minetech in 2000 to bring a mine detecting dog (MDD) capacity to
the programme to work in coordination with the NGO deminers. ANAMA decided that
it wanted to incorporate such capacity in its toolbox. However, Minetech had not been
contracted to train handlers and departed with its dogs at the end of the contract. The
US Department of State then agreed to provide MDD assistance and contracted Ronco
to bring dogs and trainers to Azerbaijan, giving ANAMA an MDD capacity which it has
maintained and expanded since 2002.
Over the years ANAMA received technical assistance in several areas essential to
develop the identified required capacities (Chart 2).
Chart 2
Technical Cooperation Partners and Subject Matter
Partner
Subject Matter of Cooperation
11

UNDP

General partner, management support, TAs, trust fund
management, senior and middle management training support,
exchange of experience with other programmes, development of
regional centre
UNOPS
Cooperating agency for technical advisors, contracting with service
providers, contracting ANAMA to provide its own staff
UNICEF
MRE
UNMAS
UN assessment mission, LIS Quality Assurance Monitor
GICHD
IMSMA, technical advice regarding legislation, dogs, machines
US Dept of State Financial support, MDD training
US
DoD, Equipment, training for EOD, demining, munitions storage disposal
EUCOM
MAG
Training of manual demining NGOs, contracted by UNOPS
World Bank
Loan funds for construction of ANAMA HQ and vehicle
procurement
Switzerland
Advisors for IMSMA, financial support
Minetech
MDD capacity, contracted by UNOPS
Ronco
MDD and handler training, contracted by US DoS
Armor Group
MDM support
SAC
Landmine Impact Survey
ICRC
Initial support regarding MRE and MVA
BACTEC
Survey
Cranfield
Senior and middle management training
University
James Madison Senior management training
University

The two demining NGOs provide management and support for the manual demining
teams, which operate within a framework established by ANAMA. ANAMA assigns the
38-person demining team their areas of operation and tasks. They have the same
ANAMA-provided training, same SOPs, same salary scales, uniforms and work rules, and
even the same menus for meals.
Relief Azerbaijan began with 27 deminers in 2000 and increased to the originally
planned 38 in 2002. IEPF, which initially conducted surveys, started with 38 deminers in
2002. ANAMA staff were trained by a US Department of Defense mission as deminers,
emergency response, UXO and technical survey in 2002, and were conducting clearance
by 2003. In 2004, the three organisations together had 107 deminers and 15 mine
detecting dogs (MDD). By 2011, this had increased to 114 deminers and 36 MDD.
In 2003, ANAMA decided that it required mechanical demining machine capacity
(MDM), and arranged with the US Department of State and the European Commission
to test a few machines. The machines selected were then purchased with bilateral
assistance.
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ESTIMATING THE SCALE OF THE LANDMINE/ERW PROBLEM

The need for good survey data to understand the extent of the landmine/ERW problem
was recognised in the World Bank project formulation reports. In 1998, BACTEC
International undertook a Level 1 Survey in Fizuli and Agdam districts. The team
surveyed 260 of the 700 square kilometres potentially mined in the Fizuli district, and
marked 3.2 square kilometres. In addition, 17 sites in Agdam were surveyed. The
landmine problem in Fizuli was concentrated around 16 villages, as well as roads,
irrigation channels and power lines.
ANAMA recognised early the importance of good information regarding the extent of
contamination. The 2001 General Survey identified a total of 60 square kilometres of
contamination affecting 64 communities in 11 districts on the line of control. SAC
conducted a LIS in 18 districts from September 2002 to June 2003, with IEPF as its
operational partner. This resulted in an increase in the estimated hazardous area to 736
square kilometres.
These surveys provided the information upon which the national programme was built.
The LIS expanded ANAMA’s perspective on the mine/ERW contamination problem in
terms of the number of districts affected and the extent of explosive ordnance left
behind at ex-Soviet military bases. This provided the basis for the expansion of the
demining programme and development of a special cleanup project for the Saloglu arms
depot which began with NATO support in 2005.
ANAMA decided that it needed to improve database information as the programme
progressed. In 2006, it conducted a review with the local authorities starting from the
LIS results, which reduced the estimate of SHAs to 306 square kilometres, a reduction of
60 per cent (Table 4). Experience gained by then led ANAMA to conclude that only
about ten per cent of the remaining area would actually require clearance, while the
rest would be cancelled through survey on a case by case basis. ANAMA initiated a
resurvey process in 2008. Continuing survey and clearance reduced the overall SHA to
184 square kilometres as of the end of 2009, comprising 280 SHAs, of which 89 were
believed to be mined areas and 191 with only UXO.
MINE RISK EDUCATION

MRE was supported by UNICEF from 2000 until 2007. During the first years, the MRE
programme expanded through:
•
•
•

group training sessions
community billboards
voluntary training of teachers and health workers

LIS found that the most common MRE outreach known to community members were
village posters/signs. An evaluation of the programme conducted in 2002 was quite
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positive, but questioned the focus on school age children, since the majority of mine
victims were working age men.
In 2004, following a change of personnel, the Ministry of Education (MoE), signed a
memorandum of understanding with UNICEF and ANAMA, to incorporate MRE into the
regular course curriculum for schools in the affected districts. Once the agreement was
signed, the parties implemented it very effectively. ANAMA/UNICEF developed
materials to MoE pedagogic standards, UNICEF printed textbooks, the MoE directed its
teachers as to how to incorporate MRE into their weekly lesson plans and ANAMA
trained 2,355 teachers in the subject matter (Table 5). ANAMA’s work with the MoE
continues strongly at the time of this study in 2011.
MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2000, Azerbaijan had two principal prosthetics hospitals, both in Baku, one of which
was run in cooperation with the ICRC. The latter hospital closed at the end of 2001.
ICRC has continued to provide technical support to government-run rehabilitation
centres.
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

When the Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme was established, there was a need for
capacity development in all areas. The original need for capacity development was
resolved during the first five years of the programme. Various external evaluations have
commended the quality of work carried out by ANAMA and its national NGO partners.
These include external evaluations for UNICEF, the World Bank and UNDP:
•

Evaluation of the UNICEF-ANAMA MRE programme in 2002 recognised that the
effort had produced a “good national capacity.” In 2004, the MRE programme
transitioned to full national responsibility as the Ministry of Education assumed
responsibility for implementation and monitoring of MRE in the school curriculum,
and district authorities coordinated volunteer community-based MRE committees.

•

The “outcome evaluation” of UNDP assistance to ANAMA in 2004 concluded that
the joint UNDP-Government “Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme has proved to be a
success. (…) ANAMA has provided evidence that effective institutional capacity
building is possible.”

•

The World Bank assessment in 2005 concluded that ANAMA has become “an
efficiently structured and well-functioning organisation operating in accordance
with international standards for demining activities.”

•

The 2008 “outcome evaluation” of UNDP support to mine action since 1999
concluded: “The mine action programme is highly integrated with all aspects being
coordinated by ANAMA. The ‘hard issues’ of mine clearance and unexploded
ordnance disposal (EOD) are well managed and targeted. The ‘soft issues’ of mine
risk education (MRE) and victim assistance area also well managed.”

•

UNDP 2009 study of “feasibility of ANAMA establishing an International Centre for
Mine Action” concluded that ANAMA “has grown into a mature, well-managed and
technically competent mine action organization.” ANAMA “has a well-resourced
and international standard training capability” and “has played a key role in
developing the mine action capacity of several neighbouring countries.”

•

GICHD 2009 evaluation of EC funded mine action in the Caucasus and Central Asia
concluded that: “Azerbaijan has a well established mine action sector. The
Azerbaijan National Mine Action Authority (ANAMA) is responsible for planning,
coordinating, managing and monitoring of mine action countrywide. While it was
not possible to assess ANAMA in detail, the evaluation team had the impression that
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it has a sound structure and is very active, not just in its duties in Azerbaijan, but
also in regional or international mine action events…Capacity building has been
successful.”
NATIONAL PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national programme management was created with the programme. The first
national director of ANAMA had an often difficult relationship with the early
international advisors, caused in part by differing perceptions of their respective roles,
including the sense that the advisors were interfering in his management
responsibilities. The issue came to the attention of the senior most government officials
and the current national director was appointed in April 2001. An experienced and
well-respected manager from the state construction sector, he entered with a mandate
to resolve the problems and nationalise the programme. He has decisively developed
the organisation and is well-respected both inside of it and out. While the initial seeds
for the national capacity were planted in 2000, it was only with the arrival of the second
national irector that ANAMA began to be guided by a clear capacity development
strategy.
Most of the middle and senior managers have participated in one or more of the
international manager training courses provided at Cranfield University (UK), James
Madison University (USA) or Amman University (Jordan). They speak highly of the
courses and of the value created by the fact that their colleagues have had similar
training, giving them a shared understanding from which to approach organisational
issues.
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES

The specific structure of the national demining centre was new and the initial
organisational chart was taken from the experience of other countries. The original
organisational structure was staffed more like a project than an on-going government
office, with a total of 18 national staff from all levels (see Annex C). Once the centre
was established with general management, finance, support and information
management, national management determined there was a need for specialised
subunits to strengthen certain functions. That resulted in the current organisational
structure:




Departments:
Operations, MRE, Information, Planning and
Development, Finance and Support Services
Division: Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division (TSQAD)
Offices:
Information Technology, Public Relations, Executive
Secretariat

Staff are distributed among headquarters and field offices:
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Head office – Baku
Regional office – Fizuli, from first year
Regional training centre – Goygol
Three operational centres – Terter, Agjabedi and Aghstafa districts
Field operations in seven districts

TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

While the specific core technical capacities were new for Azerbaijan, ANAMA had the
advantage of catching up with known practice elsewhere. Therefore, the standards,
methods and training for manual clearance, MDD, MDM and IMSMA were all initially
imported through advisors. Once this had been done and practical experience was
gained, ANAMA’s expansion was based on national decisions and training.
Technical advisors and trainers helped establish the standards, operational procedures,
information management system and strategic planning that were standard for mine
action programmes at the time that ANAMA was developing. With the relatively high
level of education that was common throughout the Soviet Union, and the opportunity
of an important new challenge, national staff responded quickly to the new approach.
As the programme moved toward full nationalisation and staff gained more experience,
the SOPs were adapted to national systems and procedures, a process which was lead
by the national staff. Further development of appropriate SOPs has taken place since,
specifically for land release and ammunition stores clearance.
IEPF and RA continue to focus primarily on minefield clearance (and MRE), while
ANAMA focuses on battle area clearance, UXO destruction and emergency response to
spot tasks, as well as MDD and MDM support to the manual demining teams of all three
organisations. At the end of 2010, ANAMA had a total of 404 employees: 253
operational staff and 151 administrative support staff. IEPF and RA each had 38
deminers and a combined total of 137 staff (Chart 3).
Chart 3
Mine Action Programme Operational Capacity, 2011
Manual clearance capacity
116 deminers, 3 organisations
Technical survey capacity
20 surveyors
Explosive Ordnance Disposal capacity
79 specialists
Emergency response team
18 deminers
Training, survey and quality assurance division 20 instructors/inspectors
Mine detecting dog capacity
32 dogs, 42 dog handlers
Mechanical demining machines
6 (Bozena-4, Bozena-5, MV-4 and EOD-BOT)
MDM personnel
18 operators and support
Support personnel
228 (logistics, inventory, procurement, maintenance)
Total personnel
541
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The various land release efforts have considerably lessened the extent of landmine
impact in the accessible regions, compared to the situation at the time of the Landmine
Impact Survey. This leapt forward with the 2006 review with local authorities of the LISidentified SHAs (Table 6), and has continued with average annual release of 30 square
kilometres since 2008.
STRATEGIC PLANNING

The current national socio-economic development plan 2009-2013 follows the previous
national plan in identifying ANAMA as responsible for:
•
•
•
•

Reducing the number of deaths and injuries from mine incidents
Promoting the return of IDPs
Facilitating rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure; and
Supporting food security

The mine action strategy for 2009-2013 seeks to:
•
•
•

reduce and clear accessible suspected hazardous areas
develop and expand operational capacity
support intensified and extended MRE and VA programmes

In the long term, ANAMA plans to further increase and reinforce its operational and
management capacity to enable it to address the mine and ERW threat from the
occupied areas once they are returned to Azerbaijan.
Ever since the first national strategy, adopted in 2001, ANAMA has had a dual
perspective on the national programme: resolving the landmine and ERW problems of
the currently accessible territories and eventually assessing and resolving the landmine
and ERW problems of the occupied territories. ANAMA has a plan for clearance of the
currently occupied territories once they are returned. On the basis of preliminary
estimations, they expect to establish seven bases, with a total of 700 deminers, 100
dogs and 26 machines, to work over a decade to ensure that the areas are free from the
threat of mines (Tables 7 and 8). ANAMA therefore seeks to maintain capacity until the
other territories become accessible, and then expand, rather than plan for programme
conclusion.
There are an estimated three to five years of demining remaining in the currently
accessible areas, as well as response to spot tasks, to provide continuing value and
experience. One reason that ANAMA has entered into contracts and cooperation
agreements with other countries is to ensure that its full structure remains
professionally engaged and developing until the return of the occupied territories.
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ORGANISATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

ANAMA and the national mine action programme have been organisationally
sustainable for several years. They value interaction with other programmes – and
would like more such interaction. The National Director and staff currently manage the
programme and adapt its structure and operations to changing circumstances according
to their own criteria.
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

Financial sustainability is assured by the high level of government contribution to the
programme budget – which increased steadily from ten per cent to over 75 per cent of
the annual budget (Table 9). This contribution is supported by the inclusion of ANAMA
since 2006 in the multiyear National Socio-economic Development Plan and its explicit
inclusion in the annual state budget.
EXTENDING TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO OTHER NATIONAL MINE
ACTION PROGRAMMES

ANAMA has signed several memoranda of cooperation and agreements, including with
the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, Croatia
MAC, Turkey Ministry of Defence Industry, Government of Georgia MAC, and the
Afghanistan DMC.
The strength of ANAMA is evidenced by its ability to provide support directly to foreign
clients and partners, including the national programmes of Afghanistan, Croatia,
Georgia, Jordan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Vietnam. These cooperation efforts build on
ANAMA’s own experience in mine action – the first and still most experienced national
programme within the region – together with the language facility provided by Azeri
(very similar to Turkish) and Russian as working languages. ANAMA has also conducted
training through translators in Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Georgian. Major projects include:
•

Georgia – In 2009 ANAMA submitted a proposal in a NATO/NAMSA competitive
tender process to provide operational and capacity development training to help
establish the new Georgia National Army entity responsible for mine action. In
spite of not being a NATO member, ANAMA won the contract. ANAMA supplied
its own equipment for the training, while procurement was underway for the
Georgian teams. Training has since been conducted in Georgia and Azerbaijan,
with nine two-week sessions covering a range of core topics

•

Turkey – ANAMA has conducted two projects with Turkey. In the first project,
funded by the Government of Turkey, ANAMA provided demining training to
NOKTA Ltd. For the second project, ANAMA has joined with a successful Turkish
consortium to provide training and quality assurance of Turkish deminers
clearing the mined area at a border crossing with Syria
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•

Afghanistan – the Government of Azerbaijan provided non-military assistance to
the Government of Afghanistan on a bilateral basis and included ANAMA in the
formulation team. ANAMA’s counterpart for this assistance is the government
body Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), the local counterpart for eventual
handover of the Afghanistan national programme. ANAMA has hosted DMC
staff for several trainings, supported adaptation, translation and printing of the
MRE text book from Azeri to Dari and Pashto, and has discussed other specific
topics of cooperation. Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
also visited ANAMA and has been pleased with the results of the ANAMA-DMC
cooperation. ANAMA and MACCA have very good relations and experience with
the exchange. MACCA appreciates the support of ANAMA to DMC on
government issues. ANAMA also has assisted DMC to prepare to take over
responsibilities from MACCA

MINE RISK EDUCATION

MRE continues to be provided in several distinct manners for different populations:
•

•
•
•

Incorporated by the MoE in the regular curriculum for schools in war-affected
districts. MoE supervises MRE instruction in over 1000 schools as part of
teachers’ normal workload, reaching a wide population
Deminers provide MRE to local communities whenever work is interrupted by
weather
ANAMA issues press releases and related cautionary messages whenever there
is a mine accident
Community MRE Committees monitor accidents and keep interested actors
informed

MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Mine Victim Assistance is coordinated by the ANAMA Information Department, within
the framework of the 2004 Mine Victim Assistance Strategy, based on the 2004 Mine
Victim Needs Assessment. ANAMA tries to ensure that mine victims are aware of their
rights to treatment and support under national laws and to coordinate economic
reintegration projects targeting mine victims. Specific projects have included:
•

•

•
•

“Community-based small business trainings and micro-credit fund for Azerbaijan
mine survivors.” The second phase began in 2010 and will directly benefit 73
mine survivor participants, similar to the number of participants in the first
phase
“Medical examination and treatment procedures in Sanatorium” provided 110
mine victims with full medical services during a three week stay at a Caspian Sea
sanatorium
Wheelchair distribution
Training/employment in carpet weaving and tailoring
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Mine Risk Education
MRE experts have long recognised the importance of working with schools. An important
achievement of the UNICEF-supported programme from 2000-2002 was the training by 15
UNICEF-qualified “master teachers” of 1,043 teachers and 508 health workers to educate
children and clients about MRE. The teachers and health workers were volunteers, and while
the results were positive they were superficial. UNICEF and ANAMA tried unsuccessfully to get
the programme adopted into the curriculum of the Ministry of Education.
In 2004, with a change in personnel in the Ministry of Education, agreement was reached and a
memorandum of understanding was signed by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and ANAMA
to integrate MRE into the curriculum of schools in the mine-affected areas. A joint pedagogic
committee developed the materials to provide appropriate content and approved text books.
The Ministry included “mine risk education” as a one semester subject, with an appropriate
teaching plan. UNICEF paid for printing of materials and, between 2004 and 2009, ANAMA
conducted teacher training for all schools covered by the agreement (Table 5). The teachers
cover the material as part of their regular teaching schedule.
The value of the teacher time involved is estimated to be equivalent to an annual financial
contribution of roughly USD 400,000, while being more effectively institutionalised than ANAMA
could ever do on its own. The programme appears to be quite effective - since 2010, there have
been no accidents involving school age children living in the affected districts and no fatalities
since 2005.
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
In many of the countries with mine action programmes at the time ANAMA was
created, the state structure had collapsed or been severely weakened. However, this
was not the case in Azerbaijan. Government offices needed to be re-established in the
accessible areas affected by the conflict, but national institutions and structures had
continued to function.
There was never a question of transitioning a programme from the UN to national
ownership, since the programme was nationally owned in the first place. The Azeri
perspective focused on the need to import knowledge related to the new field of mine
action, and resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended UN
presence within the national agency. It was an issue of practical capacity and
management control, while welcoming continued support by the UN and other
partners.
ANAMA had multiple UN advisors, both resident and visiting, and these advisors played
a strong role in the establishment and management of ANAMA during its early years.
International advisors were key in obtaining some necessary knowledge, but national
staff found that working with them was not always easy. Their role was viewed locally
as generally positive on the technical side while sometimes clumsy and inappropriate as
management and in personal behaviour.
Those who worked directly with UN advisors provide a positive assessment of most of
them, but it is often balanced by critical comments. Each advisor seemed concerned
with different problems and had their own solutions, so continuity of advice and
development was lacking. As ANAMA matured, ANAMA staff sometimes had more
experience than some UN advisors. The cost of the advisors, which seemed high,
exacerbated tensions. The monthly salary of one advisor was the same as the combined
monthly salaries of one entire NGO demining team. The experience with international
advisors left behind particularly negative memories in those few cases where the
personal behaviour of the advisor was seen as disrespectful or otherwise inappropriate.
There is no true privacy in such situations, so any inappropriate behaviour becomes
widely known, reducing the credibility and effectiveness of the advisor concerned.
International advisors (both individuals and contractor staff) rarely spoke Russian or
Azeri and had to do some or all of their work with national staff through translators.
Interestingly, this produced a core of ANAMA staff who were college educated in law,
business or other subjects, and able to interact effectively between advisors and other
national staff. Over time several of these individuals took on key roles in senior and
middle management and ANAMA HQ functions, particularly in the Operations
Department.
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The successful “mine action transition” in Azerbaijan tells a story of how specific
technical and management capacities developed. It also shows how all positions and
the effective institutionalisation of mine action was nationalised, thanks to a strong
manager who lead qualified and motivated staff with government and international
financial and political support.
The decision to move ahead decisively with nationalisation came with the arrival of the
new National Director in April 2001. He had been requested to come to ANAMA for two
years to “straighten it out.” From the very beginning, he charged the national staff to
become ready to fully manage the programme, since the “advisors will not always be
here.”
Among his early actions was the establishment of a national training and monitoring
team. Quality assurance and training had, until then, only been done by international
advisors, but from then on it was to be done by nationals with the support of advisors.
Similarly, he met with the acting CTA and UNDP to affirm this intent and clarify their
respective roles and authorities to ensure the cooperation would lead to full
nationalisation within a reasonable period of time. The new CTA, who arrived in August
2001, fully supported this.
The first national strategy, adopted in October 2001, set the goal for ANAMA to manage
most mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal
outside technical support. The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the
departure of the last CTA, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor.
The target in the national strategy proved to be realistic, even though the process took
a little longer than planned to complete.
ANAMA self assessment in late 2002: “The aim of the agency for consolidation of
nationalisation and expansion of capacity has been mainly achieved. (…) ANAMA has
established a functional headquarters staffed with qualified nationals, a regional office and a
training facility that meet international standards. Currently two national NGOs and two
international organisations are working under the framework of ANAMA. The UNDP is assisting
ANAMA with resource mobilisation and provides technical support to the Project. At the same
time the Agency is developing bilateral relations with the donor community.”

The CTA who arrived in mid-2001 was the first mine action CTA anywhere to be selected
from a mine-affected country. His background in mine action from the perspective of a
national NGO provided a practical perspective that shared the goal to move ahead with
nationalisation. He encouraged gathering experience from other programmes and
encouraged national staff to express their opinions on how work could be improved.
The National Director and the CTA worked together well, and ANAMA staff remember
this period as a very productive one, when they began having more training and
exchange with other programmes. In 2003 they completed a review of SOPs against
23

actual practice to nationalise the SOPs and reinforce knowledge about them. When
questions arose about alternatives, they tried them out and reported back to the
technical working group for a decision. Both the director and the CTA recognised the
value of work in the field. They acted to overcome the existing gaps between
headquarters and the field and between ANAMA and the NGOs, and insisted that all are
important parts of a unified programme where success depends on the work of each
one.
ESSENTIAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME CAPACITIES
What are the essential capacities required of a typical mine action programme? Based on
accumulated experience of existing mine action programmes, they can be summarised as
follows (Chart 4):
Chart 4
Essential capacities of a mine action programme
Organisational capacities of the MAC
- Overall management
- Operational management (planning, tasking, monitoring, quality management
- Information management
- Administrative management
Operational capacities of the national programme
- Demining assets (manual, MDD, MDM)
- Field presence
- Mine risk education
- Mine victim assistance
Authority and responsibility
- National demining law
- National institutional and budget integration to provide appropriate sustainable authority
Interaction with and provision of support to clients (eg government departments and private
companies whose work programmes are constrained by explosives contamination)
- Public access to information on known contamination, suspected areas and demining
conducted
- Survey teams made available to check specific areas of concern and estimate costs of action

The establishment of the training and monitoring team in 2001 was an important step
in:
•
•
•

nationalising the technical and management capacity
providing ANAMA with its own resource to refresh
renewing and developing national technical capacity
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With ten years of experience, the Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division has
delivered a wide range of training courses to cover ANAMA needs (Chart 5).
Chart 5
Training courses provided
by ANAMA TSQA Division
Basic Demining
Technical Survey
Team Leader
EOD/BAC
Site Supervisor
Integration for Joint Operations with MDDs
Integration for Joint Operations with MDMs
Instructor
Middle and Field Management
Battle Area Clearance
General Survey
Information Management
Site Paramedic
First Aid
Emergency Trauma
QA/QC
House/Wall Clearance
Railway Clearance
IED Recognition
HMA Familiarisation
Storage and Transportation of Explosives
MRE Instructor

Capacity development in the specific areas typical of a mine action programme was
sufficient to develop the capacity of the national programme. Key steps in the
development and nationalisation of specific capacities of the national mine action
programme included (Chart 6):
Chart 6
Key Steps in the development of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme
-

Hazard area information collection: general survey, LIS, review, technical survey, resurvey
Database installation and training
Demining teams trained and established
NGOs selected and prepared to administer and support demining team
Fizuli regional office and operational base opened
Training, monitoring and QA team established
National site supervisors assumed responsibility
Management training courses: senior and middle management
MDD teams trained with national handlers
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-

MDM machines selected and national operators trained
Mine Victim Needs Assessment of 2004
MRE in school curriculum agreed with Ministry of Education in 2004
ANAMA included in national socio-economic development plan from 2006
ANAMA included in annual national budget from 2006, with national contribution steadily
increasing to 75 per cent of total ANAMA costs
Successful implementation of high profile projects: Saloglu, BTC pipeline, Zobjug settlement
Direct support to other national mine action programmes
Demining law to regulate future expanded programme (pending approval)

The revision of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) required that ANAMA staff
accumulate experience to be able to review and improve them. Original SOPs prepared
in 2000 were transplanted from another UN programme to Azerbaijan; they were not
adapted to the situation or practice of Azerbaijan. Eventually, after accumulating more
experience, the 2003 review was undertaken by the team of site supervisors, with short
term advisory support, resulting in a set of SOPs that were much more relevant to
Azerbaijan.
ANAMA gained confidence in its own abilities and developed a very positive profile with
key national and international partners through its successful completion of several high
profile projects. These included:
(a) clearance of the abandoned Saloglu ammunition storage area
(b) ensuring a safe route for the BTC petroleum pipeline
(c) providing a suitable site for the large Zobjug IDP resettlement project

High Profile Project #1: Saloglu ammunitions storage area
The Soviet Union’s largest ammunition storage area in the South Caucasus was located near the
town of Saloglu in Aghstafa district. An area made up of 138 bunkers had been developed since
the 1930s. As Soviet troops withdrew from Azerbaijan, they sought to destroy the bunkers and
munitions with a series of explosions in August 1991. This produced a dense presence of UXO
over the 5.6 km2 storage area, and scattered UXO over an area of 44 km2. In the years that
followed, the explosive debris resulted in 152 UXO accidents, of which 32 were fatal. The
problem was identified by the general survey of 2001 and highlighted by the Landmine Impact
Survey of 2002-2003.
In late 2001 the Government of Azerbaijan appealed to NATO for support in clearance of the
Saloglu site within the Partnership for Peace programme. NATO/NAMSA initially considered
providing support to the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) to conduct the work. After review of
ANA and ANAMA capacity and procedures, NATO/NAMSA decided to support ANAMA to
conduct the clearance. From late 2005 to mid-2011, through three project phases (surface,
subsurface and deep clearance), ANAMA removed and destroyed all munitions within the 5.6
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km2 core area and many scattered UXO in the wider area. A total of over 640,000 UXO were
removed and destroyed at Saloglu, constituting 95 per cent of all UXO destroyed in the entire
region.

High Profile Project #2: BTC pipeline
Construction of the BP Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline to carry petroleum overland from the
Caspian Sea for ship-loading on the Mediterranean was perhaps the single most important
investment in the region during the first decade of the new century. The pipeline route had
been chosen without much attention to the potential hazard represented by passing within 250
metres of the Saloglu ammunition storage site, although the Army had been requested to clear
any hazards that might exist along the pipeline route. As the contractor approached the area
they discovered that there were indeed UXO in the immediate path of construction.
BP was dissatisfied with the lack of thoroughness of the previously conducted clearance work
and the government asked ANAMA to handle it. ANAMA set up a special team to work with the
BTC contractor on the 22 km hazardous stretch. It removed 121 UXO from a 60 metre wide
corridor and the pipeline construction proceeded without delay. This project strengthened the
reputation of ANAMA as a capable professional organisation that could be relied upon to
resolve landmine/ERW obstacles to development.

High Profile Project #3: Zobjug IDP resettlement clearance and land release innovations
Faced with demand for more rapid demining of land for critical IDP resettlement projects,
ANAMA was an early experimenter in what has come to be known as “land release”. In 2004
the president announced that all IDPs who wanted to return to villages in the liberated
territories would be housed within three years. ANAMA was able to guide the Social Fund for
IDPs to build in areas free of suspected hazard. But it was impossible to find a hazard-free site
large enough for one group of 2,104 families from several villages in Fizuli district. Existing
methods were not able to clear and handover the land for construction within the deadline.
ANAMA developed a more deliberate land release approach (the term was not yet in general
use), permitting it to assess the suspected hazard levels of different areas, based on existing
information, and apply different methods accordingly. This resulted in reducing the time and
cost for carefully processing the entire area to about one-third of what it would otherwise have
been. A total of 19 km2 were released through survey and clearance, and the IDPs were able to
move in on time. The SOP for this new land release approach was adopted in 2007 and has
increased the level of productivity of the programme as a whole.

Responding to issues often faced by mature programmes:
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The full nationalisation of a mine action programme is sometimes thought of as
appropriate only when the national landmine/ERW problem has been largely resolved,
in which case identifying and responding to the “residual problem” takes on particular
importance. The transition in the case of Azerbaijan came much earlier, and the
experience suggests that this could be possible with many programmes.
ANAMA has responded successfully to a set of issues often faced by mature
programmes looking to the future, including (Chart 7):

Chart 7
Issues regularly faced by mature mine action programmes
-

The development of high-level capacities for planning, management and coordination
Sustaining the programme, including local ownership and financing capacity (external
resource mobilisation and national financing)
Good governance of the programme, including accountability, transparency, equal
opportunities and responsiveness
Planning for handling of residual capacity
Arranging for long term management of dataset, so that future planning projects will know
what areas were suspect and what areas were demined
Remaining well integrated in the international mine action community network
Linking mine action and development

ANAMA has developed specific units for planning and resource mobilisation and they
have proven successful. Long term sustainability of the programme is ensured not just
by its good reputation, but specifically by its incorporation into the national socioeconomic plan and national budget.
ANAMA has sought to ensure its accountability to stakeholders, and transparency in its
action, through regular reporting (monthly, quarterly, each semester, annually) to all
concerned, together with annual audits of all its funding, and a separate audit of funds
received through UNDP. Furthermore, all salary and other payments to staff are made
through electronic banking, which provides a clear record of transfers and minimises
doubts that are often created in a system based on cash payments.
ANAMA recognises that spot contamination that was not previously known will
continue to appear for many decades. When it occurs now, the police are instructed to
secure the immediate area and they can rely on a prompt response from small ANAMA
emergency response teams. ANAMA sees no reason to change this approach while it is
still operating at full capacity. This relates to a somewhat unusual aspect of the ANAMA
situation, driven by a second type of “residual contamination” in currently occupied
areas. ANAMA would like to maintain its full current capacity while waiting for the
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opportunity to expand when those areas are returned. Therefore, ANAMA wants to
keep existing work and even seeks new work to allow it to maintain its structure. This is
an unusual “transition” issue, with which current ANAMA management is dealing.
The national mine action database will remain an important planning and
environmental hazard dataset far into the future. It contains critically important
information about what areas were suspected of being hazardous, which were
demined, and how they were treated (through clearance or survey). This information
will be as important for future construction and development planning as good data on
soil types, seismic risks, flood plains, industrial contamination and other environmental
hazards. It is important that the database be housed in an appropriate institution and
relies on accessible software. Since ANAMA will be around for many more years, it is
not urgent to resolve this issue now, but it would be useful to discuss it with the
appropriate national partner institution.
ANAMA has not required technical support for many years, but it benefits from
technical exchange with other programmes when opportunities arise. Ironically,
ANAMA’s successful ownership and management of the national programme may have
removed it somewhat from the discussions within the international mine action
community, which are often mediated through chief technical advisors, who, along with
technical advisors, help maintain a flow of information about developments of interest
to the mine action community. Without their presence, it becomes more important that
ANAMA actively pursues the contacts to remain integrated into those discussions. This
is not just a matter of updating email lists, but of proactively engaging in the relevant
discussions and visiting other programmes to share innovative experience.
Learning about and trying new approaches will help ANAMA to be ready to be more
effective when the currently occupied territories become accessible. If both ANAMA
and the relevant international organisations (particularly the GICHD and UNDP, but also
UNICEF, UNMAS and others) recognise this, they can be more proactive to ensure that
ANAMA staff are aware of and participate in the range of international mine action
opportunities. ANAMA would benefit from programme visits to observe and explore
the relevance of practical systems and approaches, such as for example (Chart 8):

Chart 8
Topics for learning from other programmes, for potential future development
-

Cluster munitions clearance
Use of rats for demining
Ground penetrating radar – road verification
Ground penetrating radar – other purposes
Mountainside clearance
Post-clearance impact assessment
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-

Lessons from evaluations
Land release experience

ANAMA’s work has been closely linked with development since it was initially created to
support the reconstruction effort in the war-affected regions. Since 2006, it is directly
referenced in the national socio-economic development plan for support to
development actions. Its national budget allocations provides coverage for priority
development programmes, and it can be called upon by public and private entities to
provide support outside that framework, upon approval of an appropriate project
including relevant costs.
A national demining law was drafted by the advisors in 2002 but never submitted for
approval. ANAMA did not believe that approval of the law was important at that time.
ANAMA is now interested in having a national law approved, in anticipation of increased
activity with additional actors, when the currently occupied territories become
accessible. Issues which until now have been dealt with internally or through direct
coordination between ANAMA and the two national NGOs may benefit from an explicit
legal framework in the future, when the national programme expands and new partners
join. This includes such questions as ANAMA authority within the programme,
organisational accreditation, labour conditions, etc. The law currently awaiting approval
would also formalise the position of ANAMA as part of the state structure, with
attendant civil service security for its staff.
ANAMA has the appropriate types of capacities for its work today. If it had greater
demining assets, it could further reduce existing SHAs through survey (enabling
cancelled areas to be put back into use) and conclude more rapidly the clearance and
handover of confirmed hazardous areas. ANAMA does not currently consider there to
be a need to establish a residual response capacity since it foresees more than another
decade of mine action programme activity. None of this appears to represent a
bottleneck in the ability of any other parties to proceed with their projects.
The primary future development of national capacity will be quantitative expansion.
This will occur at the time when resolution of the current conflict permits mine action
activities in the currently occupied territories. Until that time, ANAMA will seek to
continue activities at the present scale and maintain capabilities ready for rapid
expansion when the time comes to do so. This is also an appropriate period to explore
and test additional technologies and methods which may provide useful additions to its
operational toolkit.
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LESSONS LEARNT
Several important lessons can be drawn from the Azerbaijan experience, lessons which
are relevant for other national programme managers and for international organisations
working in mine action. They are discussed below in four broad topics: concept,
process, content and post-transition issues.
“TRANSITION” CONCEPT

The transition debate in mine action reflects primarily the experience of UN-managed
programmes. It does not capture well the situation of the majority of national mine
action programmes which are usually supported by UNDP. Formally, UNDP-supported
programmes are by definition nationally owned from their origin, although the strength
of such ownership varies widely, and typically the programmes have not been
nationalised from the beginning. Rather, technical advisors assist in establishing new
functions and often play roles which go beyond the bounds of merely advisory.
Azerbaijan illustrates the more frequent situation where the transition refers to shifting
the balance between foreign and national staff in decision-making at all levels.
Furthermore, it shows that, rather than seeking to “conclude UN-support”, the goal
should be to have a fully nationalised programme which benefits from continuing
partnership with the UN and others.
FROM “EXCEPTIONS” TO “INSTITUTIONS”

An important part of the transition is to establish the mine action role and functions
within national institutions. UN-managed programmes in all countries are “exceptions”.
They are externally managed and cannot be part of the national institutional structure.
It is because of their exceptional nature that they pay particularly close attention to
coordination meetings and working groups – they are not part of the normal division of
labour and need to encourage other institutions to act outside of their normal role. No
matter how well-intentioned and competent their staff may be, agreements they make
are inherently temporary.
TRANSITION PROCESS

ANAMA’s experience suggests that in most cases the transition process should not be
complicated nor too drawn out. It required three basic elements:
•
•

•

a decision as to what should be developed as the capacities of the programme
a government decision to nationalise the programme, with a reasonable
timeframe in which to gain experience under supervision and then assume
responsibility
a strong national manager who understood the process
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Capacities developed at different rates and together they required about three years.
The process benefited from a chief technical advisor, who supported the institutional
development goals and process.
ANAMA benefited from several conditions that may not always exist in other countries.
First, the state structure had not collapsed. Second, the Azeri population generally, and
ANAMA staff in particular, have a relatively high level of general and professional
education. Third, ANAMA was created with a mandate to support safe return and
development initiatives, and it depended directly on the inter-sectoral commission
established to oversee reconstruction and development in the war-affected region
chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. Fourth, the salary scale applied in ANAMA and to
the demining organisations was relatively attractive without drastically distorting the
national norm. Fifth, government funding is essential for sustainability and it began to
grow significantly with nationalisation.
ANAMA staff see a difference between being a relatively autonomous, but temporary,
UN-based structure and being part of the government, dealing with institutions and
local culture. Clearer awareness of this difference might have changed some of the early
assistance to ANAMA, eased some of the tensions that arose and facilitated the
transition.
CONTENT: WHAT TO TRANSITION

At the beginning there is sometimes confusion between “national capacity” and
“clearance capacity.” In Azerbaijan, determining what capacities to develop and
nationalise benefited from the advantage of catching up with older mine action
programmes, with the important addition that all capacities developed were to be
nationalised. Therefore, operational capacities included manual demining, EOD, mine
detecting dogs, demining machinery, technical and non-technical survey. Operational
management capacities included team leaders, site supervision, quality assurance, and
training. Other key capacities included information management, base and support
management, public and donor relations, and planning.
Tensions developed in a couple of cases when one of the parties involved seemed to
resist the change in its role (eg, site supervision and resource mobilisation). Through
deliberate effort to resolve whether the difference was a matter of principle or
readiness, and to keep clear the respective roles, the crises were overcome and further
cooperation improved. Support to capacity development and nationalisation should be
the rule in TORs and supervision of mine action technical advisors and contractors.
POST-TRANSITION DEVELOPMENT

The experience of Azerbaijan demonstrates the increased ability of the national
programme to improve once fully nationalised. Full nationalisation enabled ANAMA to
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develop new methods and procedures that were better adapted to the national
situation as well as to explore new opportunities for work and exchange with other
programmes. Some important donors and the national government proved willing to
entrust ANAMA with greater resources after it was fully nationalised. With greater
responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff
addressed greater attention to be more efficient and effective. Some innovations may
parallel developments in other countries (eg, land release at Zobjug), and can contribute
to international advance in the matter.
DON’T PUNISH SUCCESS, SUPPORT IT!

The transition debate seems to suggest that once it has been completed there should
be no need for further UN support. This suggestion is particularly clear when the
process is discussed as an “exit strategy.” The Azerbaijan case shows the continuing
importance of support and cooperation with the “post-transition” national programme.
External funding continues to be important as will technical assistance in new areas and
periodic external evaluation of specific issues or the programme as a whole. What
becomes more important is to ensure the national programme remains integrated into
the international mine action network after the departure of the Chief Technical
Advisor.
Both the national programme and the international organisations should act to ensure
that networking remains strong. Since most organisations cooperate on the basis of a
project/programme framework, it may be useful to maintain such a framework even
with small amounts of funding in order to keep formal and informal channels of
reporting and interaction active.
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RELEVANT TABLES

Table 1 – Mine /UXO Victims registered in ANAMA Database
Year
Male
Female
Status

Children

Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured

As of December 2004
289
During 2005
7
During 2006
2
During 2007
6
During 2008
0
During 2009
4
During 2010
1
During 2011 (through Sept)
3
Total (through Sept 2011)
312
Source: ANAMA, October 2011

1,652
23
15
14
9
16
4
2
1,735

8
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
9

Table 2 – Demining and land release in Azerbaijan
Year
Mined area
BAC (km2)
2
clearance (km )
2000
0.08
0.03
2001
0.47
0.23
2002
0.63
0.37
2003
1.37
3.40
2004
1.69
4.50
2005
1.85
3.00
2006
2.06
5.46
2007
2.12
4.11
2008
1.46
3.11
2009
1.67
10.21
2010
1.26
6.18
Total
14.66
40.6
Source: ANAMA Annual Reports

34
4
0
0
1
0
0
1
40

44
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
47

204
22
0
0
1
2
0
0
229

Area reduced or
cancelled (km2)
0.00
0.09
0.09
0.17
0.39
2.36
12.53
12.22
25.70
19.71
22.28
95.54

Total
Killed

Injured

341
10
2
6
0
4
1
4
368

1,890
49
15
14
11
18
4
3
2,004

Total area
released (km2)
0.11
0.79
1.09
4.94
6.58
7.21
20.06
18.30
30.27
31.59
29.72
150.66
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Table 3 – Contributions of donors to the mine action programme of Azerbaijan
Donor
1999
2000
2001
UNDP
167,849
232,177
420,000
Azerbaijan
124,111
603,537
242,000
USA
1,698,039
US-EUCOM
EC
Japan
486,724
UK-DFID
ITF
Italy
UNICEF
Norway
112,140
Canada
65,000
NATO PfP
Rotary Club
of Baku
Saudi
Arabia
Sweden
WWM
Foundation
Total
167,849 1,499,578 2,360,039
Source: ANAMA Annual Report 2011

2002
265,410
258,760
1,040,633
1,200,000
78,807
200,000

2003
155,000
203,417
1,125,000
234,000
350,000
250,000
400,000

2004
180,000
255,000
1,275,461

2005
145,000
749,561
1,803,979

1,000,000
70,000
75,000
240,000
70,000

2006
120,000
1,241,379
2,326,840

2007
125,000
2,235,296
2,200,000

2008
350,000
6,312,500
1,633,113

2009
300,000
8,086,793
483,000

2010
282,167
8,997,993
1,503,148

1,180,000
271,490
104,490

384,102

146,919

88,250

20,060

35,000

227,880

538,805

139,841

15,274

123,648

1,393,208

985,760

Total USD
2,742,603
29,310,347
15,089,213
234,000
3,730,000
635,531
796,490
650,785
640,000
213,310
112,140
65,000
3,409,142

13770

13,770

50,000

3,043,610

2,717,417

3,165,461

3,119,160

5,861,186

47,522

23,858

102,310
5,045,658

177,122
8,891,731

50,000
71,380

10,263,001

11,784,342

279,432
58,043,143
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Table 4 – Results of 2006 review in the 11 mine/UXO affected regions of Azerbaijan
(conducted jointly by ANAMA and local executive authorities)
Mined areas
Areas to be
Areas to be cleared
reduced/cancelled (sq m)
(constitutes about 10%)
(constitutes about 90%)
(sq m)
42,638,760.00
4,737,640.00
57,477,060.00
6,386,340.00

Battle areas and
areas
contaminated by
UXOs (sq m)

Region

Total
contaminated
area (sq m)

Fizuli
Terter

47,379,000.00
63,964,000.00

Agstafa

10,550,000.00

6,427,156.50

714,128.50

3,408,715.00

Agdam

18,835,550.00

16,887,941.10

1,876,437.90

71,171.00

Gazakh

24,904,554.00

19,531,848.60

2,170,205.40

3,202,500.00

Gedabey

68,501,790.00

60,362,316.00

6,706,924.00

1,432,550.00

Goranboy

12,720,000.00

9,677,731.50

1,075,303.50

1,966,965.00

Khanlar

16,785,480.00

10,601,262.00

1,177,918.00

5,006,300.00

Khodjavend

26,145,040.00

23,530,536.00

2,614,504.00

0.00

Tovuz

11,476,535.00

10,328,755.50

1,147,639.50

140.00

Agjabedi

4,660,000.00

4,160,871.00

462,319.00

36,810.00

TOTAL

305,921,949

261,624,238

29,069,360

15,228,351

2,600.00
100,600.00

Source: ANAMA
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Number of teachers

Targeted schools
in 2006/2007

Number of teachers

Targeted schools
in 2007/2008

Number of teachers

Targeted schools
in 2008/2009

Number of teachers

Total number of
targeted schools

Total number of teacher
participated in the
training

Manuals for
teachers

Textbooks for
students

78

126

15

30

0

0

11

30

144

267

23341

4680

387

5879

1364

0

0

16

30

15

30

11

22

61

129

23536

4108

313

5485

860

20

40

11

15

0

0

0

0

49

92

14270

3561

183

4200

664

0

0

0

15

30

18

41

51

107

17262

3162

380

6196

600

0

0

14

26

0

0

51

87

5561

790

200

1952

734

0

0

0

0

5

15

52

115

14874

2137

287

3912

773

15

0

0

0

0

47

94

15850

3054

164

3898

608

0

0

87

162

15401

2944

271

3594

1253

46

89

77

149

19100

3583

128

2750

618

0

0

50

97

10311

1911

159

2550

676

20

0

0

53

105

12659

2476

195

3174

720

26

0

0

86

162

29714

6210

352

6791

1368

0

0

0

0

19

34

2205

206

82

686

263

0

0

0

177

381

227

483

63569

10420

550

7520

680

0

0

0

0

0

74

142

14886

1232

150

1282

994

0

0

47

88

10879

797

94

1050

697

0

0

7

13

9274

101

16

112

244

0

0

3

9

2811

58

12

70

84

268

578

1185

2335

305503

51430

3923

61101

13200

Number of teachers

Training
posters
(4 types)

Targeted schools
in 2004/2005

Total
number
of
students
by
districts

Total number
of schools

Targeted schools
in 2005/2006

Table 5 – MRE programme targeted schools and number of teachers trained during 2004-2009 school years

1

Aghdam

144

40

81

2

Aghjabedy

62

19

47

3

Aghstafa

39

18

37

4

Beylagan

53

18

36

0

5

Dashkesan

49

24

39

13

22

6

Fizuli

80

39

84

8

16

7

Qazakh

47

26

49

15

30

6

8

Gadabey

85

24

47

36

61

0

0

27

54

9

Goranboy

81

18

34

0

0

0

0

13

26

10

Goygol

49

21

39

0

0

10

20

19

38

11

Tartar

48

20

40

0

0

23

45

10

12

Tovuz

85

25

51

20

40

27

45

14

13

Xodjavand

20

11

23

8

11

0

0

Nakhchivan AR 7
border districts
with Armenia

228

0

0

50

102

0

15

Lachin

149

0

0

74

142

0

16

Kalbadjar

114

0

0

47

88

0

0

0

0

17

Jabrail

60

0

0

7

13

0

0

0

0

18

Shusha

24

0

0

3

9

0

0

0

0

1417

303

607

379

700

108

200

127

250

No

14

Districts

Total:

Distributed materials
Total
number
of
targeted
students

Source: ANAMA
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Table 6 – Review progress in relation to LIS-identified impacted communities
District
High impact
Medium
Low impact
None
Total
impact
impacted
LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review
Aghdam
0
1
6
2
19
5
0
11
25
19
Aghjabedi
0
1
1
0
21
1
0
11
22
13
Aghstafa
2
2
2
8
16
35
0
22
20
67
Baku city
0
2
0
0
2
Beylagan
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
2
6
3
Fizuli
4
3
35
10
135
11
0
15
174
39
Ganja City
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
1
2
3
Gazakh
1
0
6
1
18
8
0
12
25
21
Gedabey
1
0
16
0
68
13
0
29
85
42
Geranboy
1
0
8
3
10
6
0
9
19
18
Goygol(Khanlar) 0
0
4
1
16
5
0
14
20
20
Hajigabul
0
0
1
0
1
Imishly
0
0
1
0
1
Jalilabad
0
1
2
0
3
Khojavend
0
1
0
1
11
0
0
0
11
2
Lenkeran
0
1
5
0
6
Naftalan City
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
0
3
1
Samukh
0
1
2
6
9
Sumgayit city
0
0
1
0
1
Terter
1
0
9
2
13
1
0
13
23
16
Tovuz
1
0
13
1
20
11
0
15
34
27
Total: 11
8
102
33
367
102
0
160
480
303
Note: The two surveys involved differing methodologies, but both sought to include all
mine/ERW affected communities and 2006 review started from results of 2002-2003 LIS.
Source: ANAMA
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Table 7 – ANAMA capacity development strategic plan
2009
1st year
Capacity
Existing
Capacity
capacity
3 clearance
6 clearance
teams;
teams;
4 technical
Mine Clearance
6 technical
survey teams
survey teams
&Technical survey
(170 staff)
( 293 staff)

2nd year

3rd year

4th year

Capacity

Capacity

Capacity

9 clearance
teams;
9 technical
survey teams
(416 staff)

12 clearance
teams;
12 technical
survey teams
(539 staff)

15 clearance
teams;
15 technical
survey teams
(700 staff)

UXO Clearance

70 staff

70 staff

70 staff

70 staff

70 staff

Emergency
Response Team

18 staff

18 staff

18 staff

18 staff

18 staff

33 MDD

53 MDD

70 MDD

87 MDD

100 MDD

6 machines

11 machines

16 machines

21 machines

26 machines

ANAMA HQ
2 Regional
Bases
3 Operational
Centres

ANAMA HQ
3 Regional
Bases
4 Operational
Centres

ANAMA HQ
4 Regional Bases
4 Operational
Centres

ANAMA HQ
6 Regional
Bases
4 Operational
Centres

ANAMA HQ
7 Regional
Bases
4 Operational
Centres

MDD Section
MDM Section

Management
Support

Table 8 – ANAMA’s plan for mine/UXO clearance of seven currently occupied regions of Azerbaijan

Regions

Suspected
contaminated
area (mln.sqm)

Total
area of
region,
mln.sqm.

Total

Priority *

1

Agdam

1 094,0

70

10

2

Fizuli

1 386,0

40

10

3

Jebrayil

1 050,0

40

5

4

Gubadli

802,0

50

10

5

Zangilan

707,0

25

5

6

Lachin

1 835,0

55

10

7

Kelbadjar

1 936,0

100

20

Total:

9 509,0

380,0

75,0

Time-frames

Total

Priorit
y

14
years

3
years

14
years

3
years

Average
demining
rate,
in mln
sqm. per
year **

1 sqm. cost
(in USD)

25-30

1,00 -1,30

Average demining
cost
(in mln.USD) ***
Total

Priority

437,0

86,2

437,0

86,2

Note: *Priority areas include roads, places of settlement, communication lines, water canals, electricity lines, etc
** This is to be done by rapid and effective capacity increase up to 740 manual deminers, 120 mine detection dogs
and 26 machines for mechanical clearance, 7 regional bases
*** The demining cost includes capacity development expenses
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Table 9 – Summary of national and international financial contributions to ANAMA
Year
National (USD)
International (USD)
Total (USD)
2010
8,997,993
2,786,349
11,784,342
2009
8,086,793
2,176,208
10,263,001
2008
6,132,500
2,7594,231
8,891,731
2007
2,235,296
2,810,362
5,045,658
2006
1,241,379
4,619,807
5,861,186
2005
749,961
2,369,199
3,119,160
2004
255,000
2,910,461
3,165,461
2003
203,417
2,514,000
2,717,417
2002
258,760
2,784,850
3,043,610
2001
242,000
2,118,039
2,360,039
2000
603,537
896,041
1,499,578
1999
124,111
167,849
291,960
Total
29,310,347
28,732,796
58,043,143
Source: ANAMA Annual Report 2011
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1

Persons Interviewed
ANAMA
- Nazim Ismayilov, National Director
- Sabir Safarov, Manager of Financial Department
- Fikret Aliyev, Operations Department
- Samir Poladov, Head of Operations Department
- Adil Aslanov, Operations Department
- Musa Jalalov, Head of MRE Section
- Murad Rahimov, Head of Information Department
- Shamir Yagizarov, Information Department
- Sabina Sarkarova, Planning and Public Relations
- Elnur Gasimov, Training and Quality Assurance Division
IEPF
-

Umud Mirzoyev, Chairman
Nick Nwolisa, Head of Programme Development and International
Relations

Relief Azerbaijan – Dayag
- Shahin Ibrahimov, Director
Ministry of Education
- Agababa Ibrahimov, Head of Education Department
UNDP
- Nato Alhazishvili, Deputy Resident Representative
- Shamil Rzayev, Senior Advisor and Programme Officer
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ANNEX 2

Institutional Structure of ANAMA in Original UNDP-Government Prodoc
Initial staffing proposal (see table below) included 18 staff for ANAMA. The proposed structure
did not allow for level or type of staffing appropriate for a government institution with these
responsibilities. Rather, it was a team division of labour for an intense but limited-time project.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
State Commission for
Rehabilitation

ARRA

International Advisory Group
(IAG)

Azerbaijan National
Mine Action Agency

Program Manager/
Senior Technical
Advisor

Director

Secretary/Interpreter
International
Training Team

Operations
Manager/Operations

Functions
Planning/prioritisation/coord
ination - develop NMAP
Contracting
Clearance, survey, marking
Operations
Training
Victim Support
Quality Assurance

Information
Manager/Information

Finance/Administration

Functions
Survey data processing

Functions
Financial Management

Mine Awareness
Mine Information System Advocacy
& PR Resource Mobilisation

Procurement
Personnel Administration
Logistic Support
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Staffing Table: National Staff
Director
Secretary
Translator
Operations Manager
Operations Officer
QA/standards Officer
Operations Assistant
Mine Awareness Officer
Information Manager
Computer Technician
Database TGIS specialist
Finance/Administration
Manager
Accountant
Clerk (Procurement,
Administration)
Driver
Cleaner
TOTAL

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
18
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ANNEX 3

ANAMA Organisational Chart
(Staff Total = 42)
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